> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.anyone.io/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.anyone.io/security/bug-bounty/submissions-round-1.md).

# Submissions Round 1

Thank you for the first round of submissions! As part of our commitment to transparency, we will be sharing bug-finding attempts here (where no additional risk is posed) alongside our response and/or mediation.&#x20;

Participants' identity will be anonymized. Submissions made here will also disqualify identical submissions made afterwards.&#x20;

#### Submission 1 | Track 1&#x20;

**Leaked API Keys in API Service Respository**\
Evidence of two exposed API keys found in the commit history of api-service. Auto-detected by Gitleaks on a local VPS. \
**Response**: Negative – misinterpretation of strings

**Hard-coded JWT for Airdrop values in Dashboard**\
Hard-coded JWT tokens and API-like keys in nuxt.config.ts for Supabase.\
**Response:** Not a secrets leakage as it has the *`anon`* service role and points to public data. However, this JWT could be stored as a deploy secret, good find!

**Unnecessary private key and certificate included in test data**\
Ran Gitleaks full-history scan. Repository: anyone-protocol/sbws.\
**Response:** Negative. We accept tests working out of the box with the same keys.

**Private TLS key included in test directory**\
Ran Gitleaks full-history scan. Detected PEM format private key. \ <mark style="color:blue;">**Response:**</mark> Negative. We accept tests working out of the box with the same keys.

**Leaked private signing keys inside Docker example directories**\
Ran Gitleaks full-history scan. Detected PEM format keys in Docker example directories.  \ <mark style="color:blue;">**Response:**</mark> Negative. We accept tests working out of the box with the same keys.

#### Submission 2 | Track 2

**Publicly reachable service at** [**containers.ops.anyone.tech**](http://containers.ops.anyone.tech)\
Passive reconnaissance scan of \*.[ops.anyone.tech](http://ops.anyone.tech) to collect HTTP status codes and final redirect targets.\ <mark style="color:blue;">**Response**</mark><mark style="color:blue;">:</mark> The containers are inherently setup as public. This track would have looked for a bypass of the oauth\_proxy.&#x20;

**CORS misconfiguration on api.ec.anyone.tech**\
During passive recon of public Anyone endpoints discovered via crt.sh, exposing a wildcard CORS policy. \ <mark style="color:blue;">**Response:**</mark> Setup for the use by certain services, but this is not ideal practice. Needs review.

<mark style="color:$success;">**Prize:**</mark> While this attempt did not strictly find a high-risk vulnerability, this was a thorough attempt making use of Gitleaks. The submitter will be contacted to receive a small prize!

#### Submission 3 | Track 1

**Leaked APIKey of Supabase**\
Manual repository review, found API key that allows public query\
**Response:** Not a secrets leakage as it has the *`anon`* service role and points to public data. However, this JWT could be stored as a deploy secret, good find as above!
